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 This Essay argues for an approach to resource access that connects  
rather than separates questions of efficiency and distribution. It proceeds 
from the premise that putting together the most valuable combinations of 
resources—including human capital—is of central and increasing norma-
tive importance. Structuring law to facilitate these combinations should be 
a primary task for property scholars working in the law and economics tra-
dition. Doing so requires engaging with the processes through which com-
plementary resources produce value in a modern society, recognizing how 
property doctrines work to put together and keep together complementary 
resource sets, and confronting the ways in which material inequality and 
unremediated injustice stand in the way of realizing valuable complemen-
tarities. Because a complementarity-based vision of property holds the po-
tential to promote efficiency and distributive goals simultaneously, it illu-
minates how an integrative approach might offer policy-relevant traction 
toward both objectives. 
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Introduction 
For decades, law and economics sidelined questions of distribution, 
banishing them from the heartland of substantive legal analysis and rele-
gating them to the realm of tax and transfer.1 Increasingly, scholars are re-
jecting this intellectual division of labor and the premises on which it rests.2 
It is now clear that law and economics cannot progress as a policy-relevant 
field without confronting the problems of inequality and injustice roiling 
society. Nor can it ignore, even by its own lights, the ways in which distri-
bution impedes or advances the modern production of value—a deeply in-
terdependent process that depends critically on mixing and remixing sepa-
rately held resources into the most valuable combinations over time.  
In this Essay, I consider one avenue through which property theory 
might contribute to this new law and economics agenda—and, not inci-
dentally, secure the continuing relevance of property itself as a modern 
field of inquiry. I have suggested elsewhere the importance of reframing 
property to focus on the significance of complementarities among re-
sources in generating value.3 At one level, this approach seems to be all 
about pursuing efficiency, a familiar normative goal of law and economics. 
But a complementarity-based vision of property also carries profound dis-
tributive implications with which law and economics scholars can and 
should engage. Not only does distribution bear on the welfare implications 
of resource arrangements, it determines the ways in which human capital 
and other resources can be combined to generate value. Resource comple-
mentarity also sheds light on the law’s past and potential responses to mis-
appropriation and expropriation, an arena in which distribution and effi-
ciency come together.4 
Property might seem like an unlikely vehicle for pursuing distributive 
aims.5 It is, by design, inertial and accretive in ways that might be thought 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. In law and economics, this move is most strongly associated with the work of Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell.  See infra note 12 and accompanying text.   
 2. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law 
and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the 
Cheap, 123 YALE L.J. 2478 (2014); Alex Raskolnikov, Distributional Arguments, in Reverse, 
MINN. L. REV., (forthcoming 2021), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3692798 [https://perma.cc/X93K-
P5Y7]; Richard Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018). Some recent 
work has been catalyzed by the publication of THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Inefficient Inequality, 5 
IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 1 (2016). 
 3. Lee Anne Fennell, Property as the Law of Complements, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 155 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds., 2020). 
 4. I am using “distribution” broadly in this Essay to refer to the spread and concentration 
of resources and opportunities among people, regardless of the basis for the claims that individuals 
might have on those resources and opportunities. See infra Section I.C (discussing the relationship 
between distributive justice and corrective justice).  
 5. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 436 (2015) 
(“Property is arguably an odd choice of mechanism for the protection of low-income people . . . 
.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2093-94 (discussing prop-
erty’s tendency to increase inequality). 
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to advance investment efficiency and protect expectations, but that also 
tend to entrench inequality and widen wealth disparities.6 Yet property law 
has also proven itself more than willing to upend entitlements and destabi-
lize expectations under a variety of conditions.7 Both of these tendencies, 
and the tensions between them, can be usefully illuminated by examining 
the ways in which they preserve, disrupt, and pursue complementarities. 
Recentering attention on the way property law creates value by assembling 
and protecting complements reveals untapped opportunities to advance ef-
ficiency and distributive objectives simultaneously—and, in so doing, to 
break through impasses that have long stymied progress on foundational 
societal problems. 
Although I focus here on property law as viewed through the partic-
ular theoretical lens of complementarity, my point is broader: that law and 
economics should look for ways to connect, rather than separate, inquiries 
into efficiency and distribution.8 There are multiple ways in which such in-
tegrative projects might proceed and a variety of contributions that eco-
nomic analysis might make within them.9 We should not expect distributive 
and efficiency aims to always align, of course, but neither should we assume 
that they will always diverge. To find paths forward that take account of 
both goals, law and economics must reinvent itself as a diverse and acces-
sible field—one marked by pluralistic approaches, collaborative efforts, 
and robust normative disagreement. In working through the example of 
property complementarities, my analysis points up broader complementa-
rities among lines of scholarly inquiry.10 
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I explains why distribution as 
well as efficiency should be part of the economic analysis of law, with spe-
cial attention to the role of property. Part II suggests that reframing prop-
erty in terms of realizing complementarities can advance both efficiency 
and equity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 6. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 459, 499, 502-03 (2009) (discussing the regressive tendencies of property, given acces-
sion doctrines); see also Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1680 
(2018) (discussing the tendency of efficiency-based policies to exhibit a “rich get richer” dynamic).    
 7. See infra Section II.B. 
 8. This Essay thus offers a counterpoint to the claim that normative law and economics 
should proceed in a modular fashion in which the discrete contributions of economic analysis are 
cabined off from other important concerns with which they will be combined at some other point 
by some other actor. See Eric A. Posner, The Boundaries of Normative Law and Economics, 38 
YALE J. ON REG. 657 (2021). While modularity might seem to have the virtue of humility, disre-
garding the ways efficiency intersects with distribution is likelier to be mistaken for hubris—an 
effect that can only be counteracted, if at all, by ever more clearly announcing the irrelevance of 
the work to law and policy. 
 9. See infra Section I.D. 
 10. For analogous observations about complementarities between empirical and theo-
retical work, see Jennifer Arlen, The Essential Role of Empirical Analysis in Developing Law and 
Economics Theory, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 480 (2021); and Saul Levmore, The Eventual Decline of 
Empirical Law and Economics, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 612 (2021).  
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I. Efficiency and Distribution 
Law and economics has characteristically (or at least stereotypically) 
concerned itself with the efficiency of legal rules and doctrines, setting dis-
tribution aside for separate treatment.11 No matter what distribution one 
thinks is best, the argument runs, it can always be achieved more cheaply—
with less distortion and deadweight loss—through the tax and transfer sys-
tem than through legal rules.12 There is an associated normative claim: that 
legal rules should focus on growing the pie, leaving slicing to be worked 
out in the domain of tax and transfer using whatever distributive principles 
one wishes to adopt.13 This intellectual division of labor has the advantage 
of freeing law and economics scholars to focus on tractable questions  
rather than sinking into a morass of distributive justice conundrums.14  
But the argument for separating efficiency from distribution in this 
manner depends on a faulty assumption: that distributive outcomes are in-
variant to the means through which they are pursued.15 In fact, legal rules 
may be capable of producing welfare-enhancing distributive consequences 
that are unattainable through tax and transfer mechanisms (and that will 
not be offset through such mechanisms).16 Property law, because of its 
power to structure access to particular resources, provides an especially 
promising avenue for pursuing such distributive ends. These distributive 
results matter: not only do they influence welfare directly, they can also 
feed back into efficiency. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 11. For legal scholars, “efficiency” has generally meant Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a crite-
rion that requires that winners from a given approach gain enough that they could more than 
compensate the losers, whether or not they actually do so. The stricter standard of Pareto effi-
ciency, which requires that a policy or rule change generate no losers and at least one winner, 
stands as an unattainable ideal. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 14, 42-43 (6th ed. 2012); Posner, supra note 8. 
 12. This claim traces back to Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional 
Objectives Should Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 
264 (1979), although it achieved primacy in law and economics due to a series of papers by Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the 
Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the 
Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: 
Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 
(1981). 
 13. There has been significant pushback against this view. See supra note 2 (collecting 
recent critiques). Many earlier papers also challenged this prescription. See, e.g., Chris William 
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000); Kyle D. Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax 
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003). For the pie metaphor, see, for 
example, A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“[E]fficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie,’ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.”). 
 14. On the appeal of dodging distributive questions and its potential role in generating 
resistance to more useful and realistic formulations of theories, see Lee Anne Fennell & Richard 
H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 813-14 (2019).   
 15. See Fennell & McAdams, supra note 2, at 1078-1108.   
 16. Id.  
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A. How Distribution Influences Welfare 
To my knowledge, no law and economics scholar today views wealth 
maximization as the law’s ultimate normative objective. Instead, those 
working in the law and economics tradition are typically welfarist in their 
orientation, although the specific form of welfarism may vary (and is usu-
ally left unspecified).17 Welfarism is a consequentialist approach that ag-
gregates (in some manner) the impacts of a given state of the world on 
people’s well-being or utility (variously measured).18 Wealth only has sig-
nificance, on a welfarist account, to the extent that it proxies for or facili-
tates welfare improvements for individuals.19   
Distribution impacts societal welfare in multiple ways. Even the least 
distributively sensitive form of welfarism, utilitarianism, involves summing 
utility or well-being, not wealth. Given the diminishing marginal utility of 
money, total societal utility could be expected to grow (other things equal) 
as money is moved from richer members of society to poorer ones.20 Other 
social welfare functions are sensitive to the way in which utility or well-
being itself is distributed among people.21 Material inequality might also 
impact utility or well-being through myriad other conduits, such as crime 
and unrest.22 
The fact that distribution matters to welfare does not tell us, on its 
own, that it is normatively undesirable to confine distributive inquiries to 
the realm of tax and transfer. But it does render that claim contingent on 
the tax-and-transfer system being able to get the distributive job done at 
least as well as any other doctrinal tools can. As Richard McAdams and I 
have argued elsewhere, there is no reason to believe that the amount of 
redistribution that can be feasibly accomplished is invariant to the way in 
which it is carried out—and many reasons to think otherwise.23 We used 
the idea of variable “political action costs” to capture the intuition that re-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 17. The approach I develop in this paper is also broadly consistent with nonwelfarist 
frameworks that emphasize human flourishing, autonomy, and pluralistic progressive values. But 
because welfarism is the dominant normative approach of law and economics scholars and has 
often been employed in ways that give short shrift to distributive issues, I focus on it here. 
 18. For a recent primer on welfarism and its many variants, see generally MATTHEW D. 
ADLER, MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE: AN INTRODUCTION (2019). 
 19. The use of willingness-to-pay as a metric thus presents difficulties to the extent it fails 
to serve as a good proxy for impacts on welfare. See Oren Bar-Gill, Willingness-to-Pay: A Wel-
farist Reassessment, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 503 (2021).   
 20. The idea that a marginal dollar has a smaller impact on the well-being of a person 
who already holds more dollars assumes that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, an 
unheroic but unprovable and sometimes controversial proposition. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 
18, at 35-36. 
 21. See id. at 15-19.  
 22. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 23, 41 (2010) (“Economic theory and considerable empirical evidence shows that material ine-
quality increases street crime.”). See generally Hsu, supra note 2 (surveying connections between 
inequality and allocative inefficiency). 
 23. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 2, at 1078-1108. 
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sistance to redistribution may be higher or lower in a given context de-
pending on framing, perceptions of fairness, and other factors.24 As a re-
sult, the magnitude of realized distributive changes may vary depending on 
the method of distribution pursued, and, crucially, may vary in ways that 
will not be fully offset elsewhere.25  
These arguments for including distributive considerations in the eco-
nomic analysis of legal rules are fairly general. But I also want to make a 
more specific claim: that property scholars are uniquely situated to con-
tribute to a research agenda in law and economics that encompasses dis-
tributive concerns. Property rights represent a way of framing and packag-
ing distribution, and their design interacts strongly with political feasibility. 
For example, emerging problems of environmental degradation or natural 
resource depletion may be difficult to address without extending transition 
relief to those who have come to depend on a particular extraction re-
gime.26 Entitlements over resources can also influence the amount of utility 
that a given distributive shift adds or subtracts. For example, owners may 
suffer “demoralization costs” if distinct, sharply defined resources are 
taken away without compensation.27  
Conversely, resource shifts that are characterized as vindicating 
rights—in other words, no shift at all once the baseline is appropriately 
defined—may be more welfare-enhancing, and more politically feasible, 
than those explicitly framed as redistributive.28 Moreover, the fact that 
people derive more value from certain combinations of resources means 
that both efficiency and well-being depend on the distribution of opportu-
nities to put together (and keep together) those complementary combina-
tions. Property law, in other words, encompasses both the roots of certain 
claims on resources and the means necessary to realize those claims. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 24. Id. at 1056. 
 25. See id. at 1082-92.   
 26. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 97 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Jonathan Remy 
Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Eco-
nomics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1730 (2007); Saul Levmore, Changes, 
Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1665-66 (1999). 
 27. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967). On the other 
hand, compensation for losers might be distributively inappropriate where the change involves the 
moral rejection of a past legal regime. See generally T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolu-
tion, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1988). For further discussion of legal responses to 
“extraordinary” upheavals in property law, see Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: 
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1. 
 28. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private 
Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 357-60 (2006). This point connects closely to questions about the ap-
propriate distributive baseline and the potential role of “pre-distribution” in reducing inequality.  
See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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B. How Distribution Drives Efficiency 
Resource distribution affects social welfare not only by directly im-
pacting utility or well-being, as discussed above, but also by feeding back 
into the efficiency of resource arrangements. Distributive rules affect effi-
ciency through two main channels: by shaping incentives to do valuable 
things, and by mediating access to valuable resources.29 In other words, 
how law distributes resources influences both what people choose to do 
with the resources they have, and what resources they can access in the first 
place.   
This first channel—how the distribution of tomorrow constructs the 
incentives of today—clearly falls within the domain of traditional law and 
economics. For example, the idea that people will only bother to sow if 
they can also reap forms an efficiency-based justification of a distributive 
rule that assigns crops to the owner of the land in which they were planted. 
Although incentives may be the analytic focus, resource allocation proto-
cols are also distributive rules. As such, they may have long-run impacts on 
efficiency that appear in contexts different from, or that flow through dif-
ferent mechanisms than, the incentive effects they are thought to foster.30 
For example, a person without land who has an ingenious idea for effi-
ciently turning crops into food or fuel cannot carry it out if she cannot ac-
cess the relevant crops.  
This brings us to the second channel through which resource distribu-
tion affects efficiency—by influencing what resources people can access, 
and in what combinations. At one level, this point simply builds on the fa-
miliar foundation of positive transaction costs.31 Much work in law and eco-
nomics examines how to bring about the allocation of resources that would 
obtain in the absence of such frictions. Here, our landless protagonist with 
the brilliant idea should be able to sell her idea to the landowner, or buy 
the land (or even just access to the crops) from the landowner. But suppose 
she cannot: her only marketable asset is her own human capital against 
which it is difficult to borrow. Indeed, she cannot even live long enough to 
work out the idea if she cannot make claims on resources sufficient to sus-
tain life. Ensuring that human capital combines with raw materials to gen-
erate new innovations sounds like an efficiency problem. But it cannot be 
solved without confronting a distributive problem. 
A current distribution that embeds unrectified past violations of prin-
ciples of efficient allocation (as ours manifestly does) is especially likely to 
have continuing dampening effects on the production of new wealth going 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 29. These two channels roughly track investment efficiency and allocative efficiency.   
 30. Whether a given resource regime produces the advertised incentive effects is itself 
an empirical question, and one whose answer is far from obvious. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank 
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). A resource 
rule that does not perform the incentive work attributed to it still operates as a distributive rule 
and should be evaluated on that basis.   
 31. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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forward. For example, the inability of people to locate in places where their 
human capital can be put to its best use generates a large efficiency loss,32 
one that finds roots in past injustices that continue to distort housing mar-
kets. The extent to which embedded past violations continue to produce 
inefficiencies is an empirical question, as is the question of how best to 
counter such effects at minimum cost. But these are matters at least as de-
serving of attention as any claim that the sowers of today must reap in full, 
or that currently entrenched interests must remain so for efficiency’s sake. 
C. The Role of Corrective Justice 
As the observations above suggest, distributive changes are not only 
and always sought as ends in themselves but also often as means to achiev-
ing other ends. In addition to advancing efficiency, distributive changes 
may be undertaken to redress past societal wrongs. This section examines 
how these corrective goals connect to distributive analysis. 
It is standard for legal theorists to distinguish corrective justice (the 
righting of wrongs) from distributive justice (fairly divvying up access to 
societal resources), and to view the former as the domain of private law 
and the latter as the responsibility of public law.33 As Kyle Logue has ob-
served, this division of labor resembles the one law and economics scholars 
draw (and that I and others have rejected) between pursuing efficiency in 
legal rules and pursuing distribution via tax and transfer.34 Just as distribu-
tion should not be cordoned off from efficiency in the economic analysis of 
law, neither should corrective justice considerations be hived off from 
work directed at improving the distribution of societal resources. 
Although the question is at some level a terminological one, I resist 
the premise that it is meaningful to separate corrective and distributive jus-
tice when it comes to property law (my focus in this Essay). This is not 
because property wrongs are not really wrongs, but rather because prop-
erty law itself is a doctrinal area constantly in search of its own baseline. It 
is also a field that is, appropriately, deeply uneasy about its own origins.35 
We cannot measure (or even establish) a wrong involving access to or con-
trol of resources without some theory of how access and control should be 
divvied up, and what entitlements go with ownership.36 Those baseline-
generating theories are distributive theories.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 32. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1329-
30 (2004). 
 34. Id.  
 35. For discussion of various approaches to the anxiety that underlies existing property 
distributions, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE 
L.J. 601 (1998).  
 36. See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 138, 146-53 (1999).   
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Baselines are both endlessly contested and profoundly mutable. Con-
sider regulatory takings law, where whether property has been taken (and 
thus requires the corrective measure of just compensation) depends on 
what entitlements one was thought to have before the government acted. 
That question, in turn, requires some distributive theory about what rights 
to resources are shared in common. For example, one’s beachfront prop-
erty cannot have been taken when the state opens a public access path 
across it, if that access path constitutes part of an inalienable public trust 
held by the people collectively. Does it? The question takes us back to who 
has rights to resources as a background matter, a distributive question.   
Nor is there some stable historical baseline that we could somehow 
discover once and for all. Instead, the requirements of distributive justice 
are contingent on conditions that are subject to change.37 For example, if a 
particular resource that was previously plentiful becomes extremely scarce 
due to an exogenous shock or changes in population, an earlier distributive 
protocol (such as assigning all rights to the people who are physically near-
est the resource) might become deeply unjust.38 The reverse situation 
might also occur, as where a well-fed individual steals a loaf of bread for 
kicks but then finds that it becomes essential to sustaining his life following 
a sudden disaster that cuts him off from all food supplies.39 Here, eating 
the bread is not a wrong, even though stealing it was. The way that property 
prototypically operates—durably extending rights to resources across 
time—means that distributive justice and corrective justice are continually 
entwined.  
To say that there is no free-standing vision of corrective justice that 
exists independent of questions of distribution is not to deny that correc-
tive justice has some independent meaning as a philosophical matter.40 But 
the claims of distributive and corrective justice run together in practice, if 
not in theory, especially when pervasive, long-running, state-sponsored 
wrongs are involved.41 Consider the large-scale expropriations wrought by 
conquest and slavery, and the long tail of state-sponsored discrimination in 
the property domain (and many other domains). The wrongs of public and 
private actors engaging in these practices, although devastating in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 37. See Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 14-26 (1992) (dis-
cussing ways in which claims to resources might change over time as a result of altered expecta-
tions or circumstances).  
 38. See, e.g., id. at 21 (“A scale of acquisition that might be appropriate in a plentiful 
environment with a small population may be quite inappropriate in the same environment with a 
large population, or with the same population once natural resources have become depleted.”).  
 39. See id. at 23-24 (observing that the same act may be an injustice under one set of 
conditions and not another, and illustrating the point with an example involving the appropriation 
of water holes). 
 40. See generally Dagan, supra note 36 (accepting the distinctiveness of private law in its 
focus on corrective justice but maintaining that contested distributive questions underpin the re-
quirements of corrective justice).    
 41. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 230-31 (1974) (suggest-
ing that a more equitable forward-looking distribution may be the best available proxy if there is 
insufficient information to accurately carry out rectification for past wrongs).  
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scope and impact, were not even legally recognized as  wrongs until the law 
revised its distributive premises.  
As property law continues to apply a set of inertial and amassing dis-
tributive rules to the unredressed patterns of holdings that were unjustly 
established, it piles continuing wrongs upon past ones.42 In an important 
sense, property law itself is the perpetrator of ongoing harm by officially 
backing, amplifying, systematizing, and entrenching cumulative individual 
and collective wrongs.43 As important expressively and politically as a cor-
rective justice frame may be, measuring the extent of these wrongs and 
formulating a plan for addressing them requires attention to distribution.44 
D. Combining Forces 
If, as I have suggested, law and economics should tackle both effi-
ciency and distribution, with corrective justice concerns folded in as well, 
how is it to undertake that project? Different scholars will approach the 
task with different goals in mind and different normative priors. Principles 
of efficiency, distribution, and corrective justice might variously appear in 
law and economics projects as prime motivators, as normative side con-
straints, as sources of operational guidance or political palatability, or as 
markers of fortuitous or unwanted side effects. 
For example, a scholar whose normative perspective emphasizes effi-
ciency might focus on the way that unequal distributions interfere with op-
timal investments in human capital. Other academics might start with a 
normative orientation that emphasizes distributive justice and employ 
ideas from law and economics to discover the most effective and least dis-
tortionary ways to diminish wealth disparities and make access to resources 
more egalitarian. Or a researcher interested in the political economy of 
distribution might consider how different doctrinal or policy vehicles stack 
up in generating distributive changes, given the costs of political action. 
Additionally or instead, a scholar committed to reparations for historic in-
justices might consider how such measures might be designed to maximize 
political feasibility and minimize deadweight losses.  
Most interestingly, some domains—and I argue that property falls in 
this category—offer the prospect of advancing more than one normative 
goal at once. Finding such points of convergence is an important task for 
law and economics because it suggests opportunities to build an overlap-
ping consensus among people with different normative perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 42. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF 
HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Waldron, supra note 37, at 14-15.  
 43. In saying this, I do not mean to deflect personal responsibility away from the human 
beings involved in committing wrongs, but only to suggest that the institution of property itself has 
continued to generate harm beyond the acts (and lives) of many of those individuals. That a hu-
man-created set of institutional arrangements can generate long-lasting harm is important to rec-
ognize in contexts where the law is unable to reach the original perpetrators.  
 44. See Logue, supra note 33, at 1323-24.    
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Where distributive moves that would improve resource access on a welfar-
ist account can also be justified on corrective grounds, for example, struc-
turing and justifying them in ways that resonate with that objective might 
sidestep opposition to purely redistributive shifts. Alternatively, the fact 
that corrective ends can be served through changes that are premised on 
distributive justice rationales may be important in contexts where correc-
tive efforts are resisted politically or would appear to require impossible-
to-construct counterfactuals. Those who resist both corrective and distrib-
utive justifications may be moved by efficiency considerations that, in some 
contexts, move in the same direction. And so on. 
Obviously, such convenient congruence will not always occur, and dif-
ferent scholars will have different answers about how to proceed when ob-
jectives diverge. But identifying domains in which efficiency and distrib- 
utive considerations align, even in part, will offer more alternatives for 
making inroads against the hardest societal problems. 
II. Remixing Access to Resources 
Property offers an ideal context in which to illustrate the importance 
of connecting efficiency and distribution. Recentering property around 
complementarities, I argue, offers the prospect of progress on both fronts. 
This Part will develop that claim. 
A. Complementarities 
Any given resource or “thing” is likely to derive a large proportion of 
its value from its proximity to or joint use with other resources. A home is 
a good example. Its value comes not only from its structure, which offers 
shelter and privacy, but also from its proximity to nearby amenities, infra-
structure, and neighbors.45 Similar points can be made about nearly all 
kinds of resources or assets, however defined; they may have some value 
in isolation, but much of their value depends on how they are combined 
with other resources. For this reason, property is importantly about com-
plementarity—putting together, and keeping together, the most valuable 
combinations of resources.46 
1. Complementary Resources 
To start with an intuitive definition: two goods are complementary to 
each other if having both increases the value of each.47 This might be be-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 45. See generally LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME (2009) (developing 
this claim).   
 46. See Fennell, supra note 3. 
 47. See Peter Newman, Substitutes and Complements, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 13269, 13273 (3d ed. 2018) (“If x and y are complements in the rough 
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cause they are best consumed together, or because using both together en-
ables the production of other, more valuable goods and services. I will use 
the idea of complementarity broadly to encompass different units of the 
same resource (like acres of land where economies of scale are present) as 
well as combinations of different resources, including labor and other hu-
man inputs. Complementarities often pass unnoticed until they are dis-
rupted or become unattainable for some reason.48 Consider, for example, 
the effect of removing one piece from a jigsaw puzzle, one card from a 
deck,49 or one cog from a machine.  
Because complementarities are most likely to become an issue when 
the relevant resources start out or wind up under separate ownership or 
control, the manner in which access to resources is concentrated or dis-
persed matters greatly. For this reason, a focus on complementarities 
brings together questions of distribution and efficiency. Sometimes these 
considerations are in tension, as where bringing more complements under 
a single owner’s control would avoid holdout or holdup problems, but 
would lead to greater concentration of ownership. Or the two considera-
tions may point in the same direction, as where a broader distribution of 
access to resources would enable more valuable pairings of human capital 
with other assets.  
Seeing how property law has dealt with complementarities and indi-
visibilities across a range of contexts offers some footholds for adapting 
doctrines in ways that can advance distribution and efficiency. Attention 
to complementarities also suggests why access to particular resources may 
offer more traction on distributive problems than simply redistributing 
money. To see how and why ensuring access to complements matters, it is 
necessary to first understand the ways in which that access can be blocked 
or thwarted. 
2. Monopoly Power 
Property rights, by design, grant monopolies over specific owned 
things.50 Whenever an entitlement is protected by a “property rule,” its 
owner can veto its transfer to any would-be buyer or demand any price she 
                                                                                                                                                                                
everyday sense, one would expect that as one has more y one would be willing to pay more for a 
marginal unit of x, while if they are substitutes one would be willing to pay less.”).  
 48. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 64 (James Dingwall & Bert F. 
Hoselitz trans., 1976). 
 49. See Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three 
Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 215, 218 (2011) (suggesting that Michael Heller 
might analogize property rights to a deck of cards rather than a bundle of sticks). 
 50. Hence the claim that “[p]roperty is only another name for monopoly.” ERIC A. 
POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS 41 (2018) (quoting W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE 
THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY xlvi (Macmillan 5th ed. 1957)). 
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chooses.51 Typically, this nominal monopoly is meaningless.52 Who cares if 
I have a monopoly over a particular parcel of land if there are many other 
identical parcels that will work just as well for your purposes?  
But when a good is unique and essential to another party’s consump-
tion or production plans, the owner’s effective monopoly can set the stage 
for a holdout or hold-up dynamic. Where relevant inputs can be supplied 
only by specific transacting partners—each and every one of the landown-
ers along a planned highway route, say—actors may be unable to assemble 
valuable sets of complements.53 Similar problems can arise in intellectual 
property contexts where access to a certain set of inputs is essential to a 
finished product.54 
Putting together complements becomes more necessary and more dif-
ficult as interdependence among separately owned and controlled re-
sources grows. Agglomeration economies in urban areas make spatial 
complementarities among land uses crucial, for example, but control over 
those uses tends to be scattered not only among the owners of the relevant 
parcels but also among political and regulatory bodies that must sign off 
on development. But even prosaic settings—two suburban neighbors argu-
ing over their fenceline—can produce acrimonious and costly bilateral mo-
nopolies. 
3. The Human Factor 
As the foregoing suggests, realizing complementarities is, foundation-
ally, a problem of assembly (or, alternatively, avoiding disassembly). And 
it is a central concern of property—a field that is all about setting the terms 
for control over resources and enabling combinations that will produce 
value. Yet what is being assembled, ultimately, is not just the resources 
themselves, but the cooperation of those in control of the resources. This 
framing shifts the emphasis to one of coordinating human inputs. Those 
inputs include all forms of labor, skill, and ingenuity, as well as cooperation 
relating to control (individual and collective) over existing tangible and in-
tangible resources. People own and control their own labor, but the distri-
bution of control over other resources has profound implications for their 
ability to create value with that labor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 51. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).   
 52. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and 
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (2005). 
 53. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (discussing difficulties that arise 
when the entitlements necessary to produce a useful assembly are fragmented among different 
owners). 
 54. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 162-76 
(2011).  
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This emphasis on human cooperation might seem obtuse and unnec-
essary. If markets are competitive and well-functioning, and property in-
terests are well-defined, prices can coordinate human behavior around re-
sources without any need for conscious cooperation.55 Complementarities, 
in and of themselves, do not change this—markets readily supply left and 
right shoes, coffee and cream, tires in useful sets of four, and so on. But 
two factors create difficulties. The first is the fact that many of the most 
important combinations of resources require assembling the cooperation 
of people who hold monopolies over necessary components, as we have 
seen.   
The second is that material inequality makes willingness-to-pay a 
poor proxy for the welfare effects of different patterns of resources.56 It is 
tough to be the high bidder on any resource without money, and difficult 
to get access to money without resources that can serve as collateral. If 
one’s primary resource is one’s own human capital, and there is no way to 
borrow against it, then opportunities to pair it with other resources in op-
timizing ways will be unavailable.57 
Under these conditions, we cannot count on price signals to automat-
ically channel behavior, and hence resources, into the most valuable com-
binations. If we can’t count on prices, what can we count on? We can start 
by looking at some of the ways in which the law already configures prop-
erty rights to pursue complementarity. 
B. Realizing Complementarities 
Property’s design operates in often unnoticed ways to bring together 
and keep together resources that produce value in combination. As Henry 
Smith has emphasized, one foundational move is defining lumpy “things” 
that embody strong complementarities.58 Things endure, enabling owners 
to capture value over a long time horizon through their investments.59 And 
because property puts things together in sensible bundles, it is not neces-
sary for people to build up sets of complements moment by moment, day 
by day, by transacting over ultra-thin entitlement slices relating to each and 
every attribute of interest.60 By strongly protecting things, property can en-
able owners to hang onto complementary combinations. However, many 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 55. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526-28 
(1945). 
 56. See Bar-Gill, supra note 19.   
 57. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 102 (1962); Stewart E. Sterk, 
Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993). 
 58. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1693 (2012) (“Property organizes this world into lumpy packages of legal relations—legal things—
by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend to be strong complements.”).  
 59. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 356 (1967). 
 60. See Henry E. Smith, Economics of Property Law, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 153 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017); 
Remixing Resources 
603 
valuable resource combinations cross thing-boundaries.61 How does prop-
erty law pursue complementarities in these contexts?  
In a wide range of instances, the doctrine of accession helps to keep 
complementary assets together even when they take the form of new and 
distinct resources.62 A calf is a different “thing” than a cow but they are 
best owned in combination, making sense of the rule that the calf goes to 
the cow’s owner.63 Importantly, this way of proceeding leverages the 
owner’s incentives to care for the cow in ways that will nurture the calf and 
pairs up the owner’s cow-care skills with a new asset that can be expected 
to make use of those skills in closely related ways (calf care).64 As Thomas 
Merrill has observed, however, accession operates in a regressive manner 
inasmuch as it gives more resources to those who already own closely re-
lated resources.65 So while it helps to achieve complementarities between 
the previously owned and new resources, it reduces the opportunities for 
people other than the initial owners to combine their labor inputs with re-
sources.   
Owned things, even augmented by accession, are not enough on their 
own to produce value. Human inputs are obviously essential, as already 
noted. Legal doctrines and regulations often supply other essential ingre-
dients. For example, certain forms of forbearance by neighboring owners 
(like not operating a smelly or noisy factory) are thought to be important 
complements to a dwelling, capable of together producing the valuable 
good of residential living. An owner of a residence could simply obtain a 
larger “thing”—a home with more buffer space—and exclude others from 
it. But the law may instead provide sufficient tranquility through govern-
ance mechanisms, including nuisance law, zoning, and other land use con-
trols.66 
Once we conceptualize restrictions on ownership as providing com-
plements to other parties, we can see how governance produces a wide 
range of “regulatory public goods” that are complements to private own-
ership.67 Some of these goods involve the enforcement of private property 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
S77, S94-95 (2011); Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 
INT’L REV. ECON. 145, 147-48 (2012). 
 61. See Fennell, supra note 3, at 161-64. 
 62. See generally Merrill, supra note 6. 
 63. See id. at 481. 
 64. See id. at 489.   
 65. Id. at 502-03.   
 66. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S455 (2002). 
 67. This term appears in literature on collective action. See, e.g., N. SCOTT ARNOLD, 
IMPOSING VALUES: AN ESSAY ON LIBERALISM AND REGULATION, 165-88 (2009); Philip G. 
Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT’L ORG. 595, 608-09 
(1995). 
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rights; others support markets in ways that lower transaction costs and en-
able people to acquire complementary goods on their own.68 Still other 
public goods take the form of infrastructure or amenities—roads, parks, 
utilities, and so on.69 Because these goods expand the consumption and 
production frontiers of everyone who has access to them, they are im-
portant complements to both private property and human capital. 
In providing these complements, law sometimes overrides owners’ 
veto powers—often for reasons relating to additional forms of complemen-
tarity, such as those among segments of a highway, pipeline, or trail. Emi-
nent domain cuts through property rule protection that would otherwise 
allow any one owner to block the entire valuable assembly. The need to 
work around holdout problems also accounts for other institutional ar-
rangements that dispense with unanimity requirements, from governance 
regimes in common interest communities to compulsory oil and gas uniti-
zation.70 The law’s remedial choices can similarly unblock access to sets of 
complements. The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange, 
which stepped away from presumptive injunctive relief for patent infringe-
ment, is a case in point.71 Law can also preserve complementarities among 
entitlements by requiring that transactions occur in certain minimum 
chunks, as where a leasehold is legally packaged with nonwaivable rights 
for the tenant.72  
Some of the most interesting examples of law’s solicitude for comple-
mentarities involve legal responses to unauthorized private actions that 
have intermingled resources in ways that are difficult or impossible to 
undo.73 Suppose, for example, that A innocently builds a house that ex-
tends over her property line and onto B’s property. When the mistake is 
discovered, a nonconsensual mixing of A’s and B’s resources has already 
occurred: A’s labor and improvements have become entwined with part of 
B’s land holdings. There is no easy way to unscramble the egg due to indi-
visibilities in the picture: B’s land cannot be readily pulled apart from A’s 
encroaching house, nor can A’s labor be extracted from the encroaching 
pieces. In order for either party to make sensible use of the commingled 
resources, some realignment in entitlements is necessary. But a private 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 68. See Cerny, supra note 67, at 608-09.   
 69. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Com-
mons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013) (reviewing BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)). 
 70. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 80 (2005) (discussing voting rules short of unanim-
ity to alter covenants in private communities); Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic 
Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S596 
(2002) (discussing compulsory unitization for oil and natural gas).  
 71. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 72. Similarly, an employer who provides housing to his workers may also be required to 
provide sufficient access rights to permit his workers to receive certain visitors. See State v. Shack, 
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
 73. See Yun-chien Chang, An Economic and Comparative Analysis of Specificatio (the 
Accession Doctrine), 39 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 225 (2015). 
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deal that does this may be impossible due to the bilateral monopoly situa-
tion that now exists. So the law steps in to realign entitlements—for exam-
ple, by forcing a sale of the encroached-upon land from B to A.74  
Although the mistaken improver in this story carried out a physical 
commingling on her own, it took the law’s affirmative act to make her the 
owner of the encroached-upon land as well as the encroaching house.75 
Small-bore adjustments like this one might seem unrelated to the kinds of 
large-scale distributive realignments necessary to unlock human capital or 
address injustice. I raise this example not for its own significance, but ra-
ther to illustrate a conceptually powerful doctrinal move that the law al-
ready has in its repertoire—one that reappears in other guises and that can 
be scaled up and adapted to new contexts. Notably, the entitlement rea-
lignment in the encroachment story, as opposed to the initial building mis-
take, represents a conscious choice to loosen property protections to real-
ize a more valuable combination—something that also occurs when 
existing entitlements are reconfigured through approaches like eminent 
domain. In these cases (and many more), the law withdraws veto power 
from an owner who might otherwise make it impossible for another party 
to achieve or maintain a valuable combination of resources.  
Consider a very different example, this time from South Africa. In 
Modder East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery, a large number of squat-
ters built and occupied dwellings upon land without permission of the land-
owner.76 When the landowner sought to evict them, they invoked their con-
stitutional right to housing. The Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa both agreed, denying the landowner 
the power to evict them unless and until substitute housing became availa-
ble—although, significantly, they did require the government to compen-
sate the landowner for the encroachment.77 Here too, we see complemen-
tarities between people, land, and housing protected against an owner’s 
prerogatives. 
Such examples also underscore the power of gaining enough access to 
resources, even without authorization, to mix them with one’s own inputs. 
Doing so changes the world, and while it may not extinguish all other 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 74. See generally id. (discussing possible remedial approaches, including forced sales).   
 75. The fact that physical commingling preceded the entitlement realignment rather than 
following it matters only insofar as that commingling heightens the bilateral monopoly problem. 
In other contexts where physical commingling has not yet occurred, the monopoly position of re-
source owners may be less clear; there may be alternative aggregations available, or substitutes 
for particular components. But as outside options narrow and holdout potential rises, the situa-
tions start to resemble each other. It should not be surprising, then, to see legal doctrines that 
override the veto power of property owners in both types of situations. 
 76. 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 77. See Modder East Squatters & Others v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (8) 
BCLR 821 (SCA) (S. Afr.); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 786-91 (2009) (discussing Modderklip). 
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claims, it can create combinations that become difficult to undo outright.78 
To be sure, there are reasons to be skeptical of approaches that prioritize 
what we might think of as the brute facts on the ground: who manages to 
grab hold of something belonging to someone else and hang onto it. Own-
ers’ expenditures to protect their assets, and nonowners’ efforts to over-
come those protections, introduce deadweight loss and an arbitrariness 
based on raw power.79 And validating results brought about by brute force 
can encourage and reward unjust as well as justified efforts at resource ap-
propriation. 
Of course, we need look no further than our own property system to 
find pervasive protection of resources assembled from unjustly obtained 
inputs. Today’s patterns of property holdings stand on a foundation of ex-
propriated inputs of labor and land, among other injustices. What, if any-
thing, can we learn by placing this fact alongside smaller examples of com-
plements assembled without authorization? The most obvious lesson is 
that misappropriations that are incorporated into new combinations will at 
least give rise to compensation obligations, even if the appropriator is al-
lowed to retain the finished product—an observation with pointed impli-
cations for reparations. But additional insights flow from examining why 
the law might allow a new combination of resources to remain in a misap-
propriator’s hands at all. 
A core argument against giving resources back, that what was taken 
has become so thoroughly incorporated into the lives and projects of cur-
rent owners as to defy disaggregation,80 boils down to a claim about com-
plementarities between people and resources. We need not accept this 
claim at face value, especially where past expropriations act as continuing 
deprivations that leave behind painful gaps in people’s lives.81 Still, to the 
extent the law privileges complementarities over prior claims on resources, 
it should be consistent in doing so. This observation suggests a strategy that 
law and policy can consciously pursue: expanding opportunities for people 
to access resources that complement their productive capacities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 78. Cf. EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: 
HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 140-41 (2010) 
(discussing how civil disobedience can change the world by overcoming political inertia and “im-
aginative deficits”). 
 79. See generally Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex 
Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997) (discussing the inefficiency of protective 
measures and countermeasures, as well the strategy of avoiding owning resources that might be 
taken). 
 80. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complexities of Land Reparations, 39 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 874 (2014). 
 81. See Ezra Rosser, The Political Possibilities of Reparations, 1 L. & SOC. INQUIRY F. 
20, 20 (2015) (observing that “for some people identity is marked by absence of property as much 
as by ownership of property”).  
Remixing Resources 
607 
C. Remixing and Unmixing 
Property law has a tendency toward entrenchment that fosters stabil-
ity but can have highly undesirable system-wide distributive effects over 
time.82 It acts as an accumulating machine that continually layers new ac-
cretions onto holdings shaped by a history of pervasive injustice. Carrying 
out a reset of some kind is essential to both distribution and efficiency.83 
Enabling people to access tangible and intangible resources for which their 
own labor serves as complements can help to counter some of property’s 
inherently regressive tendencies. But what form should such access take? 
And on what conceptual footing should it stand?  
Some concrete examples can be found in past populist policies, includ-
ing the Homestead Acts—which, despite serious failings, sought to democ-
ratize land ownership.84 As Anna di Robilant has explained, these policies 
are echoed in modern calls for “pre-distribution” reforms.85 Instead of re-
distributing wealth or income ex post, pre-distribution focuses on altering 
market structures and resource access ex ante in ways that encourage a 
more egalitarian set of results.86 A reform agenda that focuses on access to 
key resources like housing, education, and credit harnesses complementa-
rities to make human capital more productive.87 Such reforms can and 
should revisit what it means to own particular assets, including the extent 
to which ownership entails the power to veto access.88 
An idea implicit in Modderklip—that property ownership is inher-
ently contingent, and that its content and protection depends on other so-
cietal arrangements for meeting basic needs—offers further guidance.89 A 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 82. See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 38 (1992) (observing that 
stability’s normative valence “depend[s] on the substantive nature of the outcomes” and noting 
the way in which it can entrench disadvantage). 
 83. Cf. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD 51 (2000) (discussing the 
“periodic redistribution” contemplated by the Jubilee Year). 
 84. See Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. 933, 945-57 (2017); 
see also Rosser, supra note 5, at 450-51 (observing that although the Homestead Acts sought to 
democratize access to capital, “the settlement of the Midwest relied upon dispossessing Indians”).  
 85. di Robilant, supra note 84, at 982-85.  The term “pre-distribution” was coined by 
Jacob Hacker. See generally Jacob S. Hacker, The Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class De-
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Diamond eds., 2015). 
 86. See, e.g., di Robilant, supra note 84, at 982-85.  
 87. See id. So too does ensuring that everyone has access to critical environmental goods 
like clean air and safe drinking water. 
 88. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES 
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 3-6, 15-18 (2019) (noting how law encodes resources as capital and 
protects them through state force). See generally HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
PROPERTY (2021) (developing an approach to property that emphasizes the interests of 
nonowners as well as owners). 
 89. Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 244 
(1993) (“The welfare state is a way of ensuring that no one should ever be in such abject need that 
he would be driven to violate otherwise enforceable rules of property.”).  
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recent U.S. example, Martin v. City of Boise, takes a similar tack by for-
bidding (on Eighth Amendment grounds) the city’s enforcement of rules 
against sitting and lying down in public against homeless individuals so 
long as there is insufficient shelter space to house them.90 Although not 
framed in these terms, the case is really about complementarities: access to 
physical space is strictly complementary to life itself, given that life-sustain-
ing activities like sleeping must occur somewhere.91 If the city wants to 
keep its public spaces free of sleepers, it must provide an alternative. This 
same idea of contingency rooted in complementarity appears in other 
property contexts. For example, the public’s right to the foreshore, embod-
ied in the public trust doctrine, is worthless without a complementary 
good—some means to access the beach.  But the extent to which private 
landowners will be required to provide that access may depend on what 
other options for access exist.92 
More broadly, we can understand all property entitlements as accru-
ing subject to claims by other members of society. As we see from existing 
property doctrines, appropriations of the inputs of others can generate 
such claims. We need not look far to find such past appropriations.93 But 
even in the absence of the intentional and systematic expropriation that 
our history undeniably contains, property entitlements characteristically 
draw from a common stock in ways that might be understood to generate 
some sort of debt to the public at large. For example, the Lockean pro-
viso—“enough, and as good, left in common for others”—suggests a con-
dition in which the raw materials converted through labor are sufficiently 
plentiful that no one is deprived of a similar opportunity to mix their labor 
with such resources. But this condition is not met—or is no longer met—if 
resources thus converted are later monopolized in ways that preclude just 
such mixing.94 Similarly, a variety of “use or lose doctrines” make an 
owner’s claim to a resource contingent on her continuing use of it.95 This 
idea echoes Locke’s proviso that one should take no more than one can 
put to use before it spoils.96 
Recognizing a societal claim against current property holdings need 
not depend on adopting a Lockean vision of property, however. The same 
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point can be made by observing all the ways in which commonly owned or 
publicly supplied inputs (including infrastructure of all types) make private 
property more valuable.97 Improving resource access directly may be both 
more feasible and more effective than delivering cash compensation to the 
public at large for its contributions to the creation of private wealth. A fo-
cus on resource access also has the potential to improve the targeting of a 
distributive program that is premised, at least in part, on the ways in which 
the monopolization of resources through ownership limits opportunities.  
The fact that current accretions are built on a foundation of historic 
injustice provides an independent basis for claims on owned resources. An 
access-expanding approach answers a frequently raised objection to repa-
rations, that it is impossible to know what the counterfactual world would 
have looked like in the absence of widespread injustice.98 There is perhaps 
no more direct way to move closer to the modern conditions that would 
have obtained in that counterfactual world than to remove the barriers to 
resource access that past systems of injustice erected and that remain today 
through the operation of an inertial, accretive property system.99 The re-
sults provide a self-executing way of delivering, however imperfectly and 
inadequately, some measure of that counterfactual world.  
To take an especially salient current example, consider access to hous-
ing. Housing access has been dramatically and wrongfully limited in the 
past through state-sponsored segregation and complicity in private racial 
exclusion—wrongs that continue to shape residential patterns today.100 As 
a result of this history as well as ongoing laws and policies that constrain 
housing opportunities, many people are unable to access a good that is an 
essential complement to optimizing their own human capital. Here, ineq-
uity gives rise to a much-noted modern inefficiency: people cannot locate 
in the labor markets where their own skills and talents can be most pro-
ductive.101 
Why is it not possible for any individual capable of succeeding in a 
given city to be the high bidder on an ideally located housing unit? One 
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issue is liquidity. It is impossible to outbid competitors for a prized housing 
unit if one’s only asset is one’s raw human capital that has not yet been 
paired with a maximizing employment opportunity, and cannot be bor-
rowed against. A second problem is even more intractable, and it illustrates 
why ensuring access to specific resources can offer a more effective solu-
tion than simply rearranging money: the amount one must bid on a housing 
unit is artificially elevated because land use regulations have suppressed 
housing supply.102  
In other words, one is not even able to bid on the right thing: the 
neighbors’ NIMBY blocking rights that keep more housing from being 
built. Better housing supply would broadly expand resource access for ev- 
eryone for whom property in a given locality is an input to their best plans, 
but no one acting alone can overcome the incumbents’ effective monopoly. 
Development approval is a strict complement to each new unit of housing, 
and the government holds a monopoly on it that it exercises on behalf of 
those with the most political power—incumbents. Resources, including a 
great amount of human potential, go to waste as a result. 
Making property holdings more explicitly contingent and comple-
mentarity-based offers a possible way forward.103 Finding the best ways to 
accomplish that task is a project much larger than this Essay. But it is the 
sort of project that property scholars, including those working in law and 
economics, should tackle. 
Conclusion 
This Essay has shown one way in which law and economics can push 
into new normative terrain. By focusing on the ways in which resources 
and human inputs combine to produce value, it becomes possible for prop-
erty scholars to engage with issues of distribution, fairness, and historic in-
justice—all within a normative framework that accommodates economic 
analysis. In suggesting these possibilities, I have two aims in mind. 
The first is to trace some implications of a complementarity-focused 
understanding of property. A focus on complements offers a way of break-
ing the deadlock between those who see property as a system of efficient 
incentives and those who see it as a system for promoting progressive dis-
tributive values. Neither camp can advance its agenda without finding bet-
ter ways to address societal inequality and historic injustice. We are in need 
of fresh ideas, and I hope that the incomplete sketch I have offered here 
will catalyze some further thinking in this vein.  
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My second goal is to make a larger meta-point, in keeping with the 
theme of this conference, about the domain of modern law and economics. 
If law and economics scholars can begin thinking about how to break de-
structive cycles of cumulative disadvantage in what is probably the most 
inertial field known to law, property, then the possibilities are truly bound-
less. 
